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RECENT DECISIONS
The Second Amendment is a limitation upon the power of Con-
gress and not upon the states.' 5 However, since all citizens capable
of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force of the United
States, the states cannot prohibit people from bearing arms so as to
prevent them from assisting in national defense.16 The framers of
the Constitution could not have intended that their recognition of the
right to bear arms was to be perverted by wrongdoers into an aid
against societal control of crime. In a previous case upon the Act,
the Court stated that "* * * The second amendment to the Constitu-
tion * * * has no application to this act. The Constitution does not
grant the privilege to racketeers and desperadoes to carry weapons of
the character dealt with in the act. It refers to the militia; to the
protective force of government; to the collective body and not individ-
ual rights." 17
A. S. V.
COPYRIGHTS-RIGHT TO MAINTAIN INFRINGEMENT SUIT-SUF-
FICIENCY OF COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 12, COPYRIGHT ACT 1909.-
Petitioner sought an injunction, damages, etc., because of alleged
unauthorized use of a magazine article copyrighted under the Copy-
right Act. Petitioner published a monthly magazine and claimed
copyright by printing thereon the required statutory notice.' Subse-
quently, and before 2 petitioner deposited copies and received a certifi-
cate of registration,3 respondents published and offered for general
sale a book containing material substantially identical with an article
contained in petitioner's magazine. Respondents deposited copies in
the copyright office and received a certificate of registration before
petitioner did. Its book contained usual notice of claimed-copyright
'5 United States v. Cruishank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875); Presser v. Illinois,
116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 580 (1886).
1 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 580 (1886).
17 United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D. C. Fla. 1935).
135 STAT. 1077 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 9 (1934) ("Any person entitled
thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof
with the notice of copyright required by this title; and such notice shall be
affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United States
by authority of the copyright proprietor. * * * ").
2 Fourteen months elapsed between the publication and the submission of
copies for deposit in the Copyright Office and a certificate of registration
obtained * * * the respondents published and offered for sale their book six
months before the petitioner's deposit of copies and receipt of certificate of
registration.
3 35 STAT. 1078 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. § 10 (1934) ("Such person may
obtain registration of his claim to copyright by complying with the provisions of
this Act, including the deposit of copies, and upon such compliance the register
of copyrights shall issue to him the certificate provided for in section 55 of
this title").
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by a printing thereon. Petitioner alleged that, under the statute,4
"prompt" deposit of copies of the published work is not a condition
precedent to an action for infringement and that mere deposit before
suit satisfies the Act.5  Respondents concede that petitioner secured,
upon publication, a valid copyright, but allege that although "prompt"
deposit of copies is not prerequisite to copyright, no action can be
maintained because of infringement prior in date to a tardy deposit.
The trial court sustained petitioner's demands. The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the cause as copies of the magazine had not
been "promptly" deposited in the copyright office under Section 12
and, therefore, petitioner could not be heard. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, three judges dissenting, reversed.
While no action or proceeding can be maintained for infringement of
copyright until copies of the copyrighted material are actually depos-
ited in accordance with the provisions of the statute,6 mere delay in
depositing will not destroy the right to sue. A deposit prior to the
institution of an infringement suit is sufficient compliance with Sec-
tion 12. The Washington Publishing Co., Inc. v. Drew Pearson,
Robert S. Allen and Van Rees Press, Inc., - U. S. -, - Sup. Ct.
- (1939).
The interpretation and construction to be given the wording of a
statute is the extent of the problem. The word "promptly" 7 as con-
tained in Section 12 is essentially the subject of analysis. What did
the draftsmen of the Act intend? The Court itself was divided.8
It was argued by the respondents that the provision in Section 12
covering actions should be interpreted as though it contained the word
"promptly", and "unless" instead of "until", so that it would read:
No action shall be maintained for infringement of copyright "unless"
the provisions of this Act with respect to the deposit of copies
"promptly" and registration of such work shall have been complied
with. The majority opinion found disfavor with this as reading in
something the letter of the Act gave no reason to imply, and said:
"Petitioner's claim of copyright came to fruition immediately upon
publication. Without further notice it was good against the world.
Its value depended upon the possibility of enforcement. * * * The
435 STAT. 1075, 1088 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
538 STAT. 311 (1914), 17 U. S. C. § 12 (1934) ("After copyright has been
secured by publication of the work with the notice of copyright as provided in
section 9 of this title, there shall be promptly deposited in the copyright office
or in the mail addressed to the register of copyrights, Washington, District of
Columbia, two complete copies of the best edition thereof then published. * * *
No action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in
any work until the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of copies
and registration of such work shall have been complied with").
6 Ibid.
7 38 STAT. 311 (1914), 17 U. S. C. § 12 (1934) ("After copyright has been
secured by publication of the work with the notice of copyright as provided in
§ 9 * * * there shall be promptly deposited in the copyright office * * * ").
8 Mr. justices Hughes, McReynolds, Butler, Stone and Frankfurter for
petitioner. Mr. Justices Roberts, Reed and Black dissented.
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use of the word 'until' in Section twelve rather than 'unless' indicates
the mere delay in making deposit of copies was not enough to cause
forfeiture of the right theretofore distinctly granted." 9
The penalty for delay clearly enunciated in Section 13 10 ade-
quately handles delinquents. If Section 12 were endowed with a
more sweepingly drastic application, it might inundate the obviously
intended benefits of the Act. The report of the Congressional Com-
mittee"' calls attention to the fact that forfeiture after notice and
three months' further delay was considered by some to be too severe.
A reading of Sections 12 and 13 together,' 2 facilitates an understand-
ing of the Congress' intention that while no action can be maintained
before copies are actually deposited, mere delay will not destroy the
right to bring an action. "Such forfeitures are never to be inferred
from doubtful language." 13
It is offered that the Act of 1909 treads a new path in the trend
of copyright law, being revisionary in wordage and design. Its inno-
vations indicate new and distinct advantages to publishers and writers
while stripping them of burdensome requirements; thereby lending an
9For statement of the views of the Copyright Office concerning Act of 1909
and practice thereunder, see Letter from the Register of Copyrights to the
Librarian of Congress, Sept. 17, 1938. The following appears therein at p. 20:
"The failure to make deposit within the proper time does not in itself
invalidate the copyright which has already been secured by publication with
notice; this can now result only after failure to make deposit upon actual notice
as provided in Section 13.
"It is true that Section 12 provides that no action or proceeding shall be
maintained for infringement until the 'deposit of copies and registration' have
taken place, which presumably was added as a special inducement to make
prompt deposit; but this does not answer the question.
"Heretofore, the practice of the office has been to accept copies at any time
subsequent to publication with notice; thus, in effect, attaching no significance
to the word 'promptly'; and certain decisions of the courts seem to sanction the
practice. * * *
"It seems very desirable to remove this doubt and uncertainty by eliminating
the word 'promptly' from Section 12, leaving Section 13 as heretofore to take
care of any delinquent. * * *"
10 35 STAT. 1078 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 13 (1934) ("Should the copies called
for by section twelve of this title not be promptly deposited as herein provided
in this title, the register of copyrights may at any time after the publication of
the work, upon actual notice, require the proprietor of the copyright to deposit
them, and after the said demand shall have been made, in default of the deposit
of copies of the work within three months from any part of the United States,
except an outlying territorial possession of the United States, or within six
months from any outlying territorial possession of the United States, or from
any foreign country, the proprietor of the copyright shall be liable to a fine of$100.00 and to pay to the Library of Congress twice the amount of the retail
price of the best edition of the work, and the copyright shall become void").
11 See note 14, infra.
12 The report of the House Committee on Patents suggests such a reading.
See notes 9, 12, supra.
13 Mr. Justice McReynolds writing the majority opinion. This view is in
accord with the interpretation of somewhat similar provisions of the English
Copyright Act. See Lumiere v. Path6 Exchange, 275 Fed. 428 (C. C. A. 2d,
1921).
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encouraging hand to create endeavor.1 4  Associate Justice Black has
said 15 that "the judgment here rests upon the conclusions: (1) that
the statute grants a copyright from the date of first publication with
notice; (2) that after deposits are made the statute permits a retro-
active recovery for public use of an article of which copies were never
promptly deposited as required by the statute; (3) that Section 13
provides an exclusive penalty for failure to make the deposit; and
(4) that according to administrative interpretation of the Act deposits
are not essential." It is difficult to fit these conclusions into the
historic pattern of the Copyright Act.
There is no novelty to the requirement of the Act of 1909 that
deposit of copies shall be made after the copyright has been secured.16
Every Copyright Act, including the original Act of 1790, provided for
a copyright interest which (as in the 1909 Act) vested prior to the
time by which the last deposit is required. 17 All copyright laws before
1891 had required deposit within some designated period after publi-
14 See Act of March 3, 1891, c. 565. 26 STAT. 1106 (1891); Goubaud v.
Wallace (1877), 36 L. T. R. (N. s.) 704, 705; Cate v. Devon and Exeter Con-
stitutional Newspaper Co. (1889), L. R., 40 Ch. D. 500; Lumiere v. Path6
Exchange, 275 Fed. 428 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Mittenthal v. Berlin, 291 Fed.
714 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
See Report of House Committee on Patents, Feb. 22, 1909 (No. 2222).
Among other things this says: "Sections 12 and 13 deal with the deposit of
copies, and should be considered together. They materially alter the existing
law, which provides that in order to make the copyright valid there must be
deposited two complete copies of the book or other article not later than the
date of first publication. The failure of a shipping clerk to see that the copies
go promptly forward to Washington may destroy a copyright of great value,
and many copyrights have been lost because by some accident or mistake this
requirement was not complied with. The committee felt that some modification
of this drastic provision, under which the delay of a single day might destroy a
copyright, might well be made. * * *"15 Mr. Justice Black wrote the dissenting opinion.
1638 STAT. 311 (1914), 17 U. S. C. § 12 (1934) * * * That after copy-
right has been secured * ** there shall be * ** deposited * * * two complete
copies.").
17 It is true that the 1909 Act grants a copyright upon first publication;
that is, before the date on which deposit is required. But all the previous Acts
granted a copyright interest from the time of recording the title of an article
and recording always took place before the date by which the last deposits
were required.
Section 4 of the first Act of 1790, 1 STAT. 124, 125 (1790), required the
last deposit of one copy of the copyrighted article "within six months after the
publishing thereof. * * *" Section 4 of the Act of 1831, 4 STAT. 436, 437,
required the last deposit to be made "within three months from the publica-
tion. * * *" Section 2 of the Act of 1865, 13 STAT. 540, required the last
deposit to be made "within one month of the date of publication * * * ", the
Act of 1867, 14-STAT. 395, required deposit "within one month after publica-
tion. * * *" Section 93 of the Act of 1870, 16 STAT. 213, required the last
deposits "within ten days after * * * publication. * * * " Revised Statutes of
1878, No. 4956, required the last deposits "within ten days from the publica-
tion. * * *" Section 3 of the Act of 1891, 26 STAT. 1106, required deposit not
later than the day of publication. * * *" Section 12 of the Act of 1909, 35
STAT. 1078, provides that "after Copyright, * * * there shall be promptly
deposited * * *."
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cation. The Act of 1891, however, required deposit "not later than
the date of first publication." The Bill Committee of the 1909 Act
thought this requirement too hard for the reason that "the delay of a
single day" after publication in making the deposit "might destroy a
copyright" and so the committee recommended an extension of time
for deposit.' 8 Thus the question: what did Congress have in mind
when it continued in the 1909 revision of the copyright laws the
requirement for the deposit of copies arises. A glance at the source
of the expression and the judicial construction of it prior to the 1909
Act will give perspective 19 to the instant Act. Prior to the 1909 Act
the United States Supreme Court construed provisions for deposit as
essential requirements to the perfection of copyright, whether consid-
ered as conditions precedent or subsequent. The committee reporting
the 1909 Act pointed out that "under existing law (the 1891 Act
being then in force) the filing of title and deposit of copies on or before
the date of first publication are 'conditions precedent' and any failure
to comply with them works a forfeiture of the copyright. It is pro-
posed under this bill to so change this as to have the copyright effective
upon the publication with notice and the other formalities become
'conditions subsequent'." 20
Petitioners asserted monopoly rights rest solely on the letter
and intent of the statute.21  The Act requires "prompt deposit." Ad-
mittedly, petitioner delayed fourteen months after publication before
making deposit.
Did Congress intend that the requirement as to deposits must be
literally complied with in order to perfect the copyright interest under
the 1909 Act? The majority opinion, in effect, does not make such
a compliance necessary but history, apparently, is on the side of the
dissenters.22
A. J. S.
CRIMINAL LAw-DIsORDERLY PERSON-SECTION 899(5) CON-
STRUED.-The defendant was accused under Section 899(5) of the
New York Code of Criminal Procedure which provides: "Persons
Is Instead of requiring deposit within a fixed number of days, or by the
date of publication, the bill as reported, and the 1909 Act as passed, permitted
a copyright to be perfected by a "prompt deposit" after publication. The com-
mittee did not recommend, nor did Congress provide, that Copyright could be
perfected without deposit; the committee did recommend an extension of the
time for deposit.
19 Kepnor v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct. 797 (1904).
20 H. R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
21 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244, 24 Sup. Ct. 797 (1888) ; Caliga v.
Inter Ocean Newspaper, 215 U. S. 182, 30 Sup. Ct. 38 (1909) ; Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 346, 28 Sup. Ct. 722 (1908) ; Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Walker, 210 U. S. 356, 367, 28 Sup. Ct. 726 (1909).
22 See dissenting opinion of Justice Black in instant case.
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